University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiSur

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

12-3-2010

Ecuadoran Government Attempts to Reform
Autonomous and Corrupt Police
Luis Ãngel Saavedra

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur
Recommended Citation
Ãngel Saavedra, Luis. "Ecuadoran Government Attempts to Reform Autonomous and Corrupt Police." (2010).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/13922

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 078079
ISSN: 1060-4189

Ecuadoran Government Attempts to Reform Autonomous
and Corrupt Police
by Luis Ángel Saavedra
Category/Department: Ecuador
Published: Friday, December 3, 2010
The Sept. 30 police uprising in Ecuador has finally shed light on various internal anomalies that
the national government wants to correct related both to the way that top-leadership hierarchies
are structured as well as to the procedures adopted to confront crime and, not infrequently, police
dissidence.
As background, human rights organizations have long complained about police autonomy, since
the Ecuadoran police force is perhaps the only one in the world that has its own personería jurídica
(legal personality or status). This means that it is an independent institution with its own legal
representation, in this case the Comandante General de Policía, and can enter into contracts or
agreements with whomever it chooses, irrespective of government policies, such as its cooperation
agreements with the US Embassy.
Thus, while the police force is an institution under the Ministerio del Interior (formerly Ministerio
de Gobierno), the ministry does not control the promotion system nor may it oversee the
agreements that the police force makes under the protection of its own legal status.

Actions outside the law
Using this operational discretionary power, the police created special forces to combat crime or
police dissidence, including the Grupo de Apoyo Operacional (GAO), which was in charge of
fighting organized crime. Investigations by the truth commission (Comisión de la Verdad), created
by President Rafael Correa's administration to investigate human rights violations (NotiSur, Oct.
15, 2010), found that the GAO was responsible for countless extrajudicial executions and forced
disappearances of criminals—or persons suspected of being criminals.
One of the most notorious cases was the September 2003 Caso Fybeca, in which a criminal gang
attempted to rob the Fybeca pharmacy in Guayaquil. The GAO response resulted in the deaths
of eight persons, including both assailants and bystanders who were in the pharmacy at the time.
Three other persons were captured and later disappeared.
The report of UN Special Rapporteur for extrajudicial executions Philip Alston, released following
his July visit, confirmed the complaints against the GAO, based on information that included police
reports. "The Ministry of Government provided information that 27 individuals had been killed by
the police between 2000 and 2009. The Inspector General of the police provided information that 104
persons had been killed by the police from 2005 to present, although information was not provided
on what proportion of these were unlawful killings. One NGO [nongovernmental organization]
estimated 164 extrajudicial killings between 2000 and 2006," said Alston's report.
Another controversial group was the Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales (UIES), whose
job included handling police intelligence. It related to US intelligence agencies and provided
them classified information without the national government's knowledge. In exchange for this
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information, UIES received financing directly from the US Embassy, and embassy officials also had
the right to select UIES members and approve promotions.

Promotions and enrichment
In addition to these irregularities, the leadership of the major elite police groups used secret systems
to coordinate such things as officer promotions—where buying and selling positions was not
unknown, since the price of any given position in any given city was public knowledge. These open
secrets were not easily proved because of the system of retaliations within the police structure.
Certain positions were very coveted because they generated income beyond the police salaries, such
as bribes to traffic cops, who were required to collect a quota of bribes that were later shared with
their superiors.
A similar process took place in other areas under police control, such as issuing drivers licenses and
migration permits, and, most seriously, in direct dealings with organized crime.
Enrichment, especially among the top police leadership, was evident in the real estate they bought,
such as large haciendas or residential developments, without being able to show income to justify
the large purchases. Most income tax declarations filed by police officials show no taxes owed.

The government opts for purging
From the beginning, the Correa administration, through the first government minister Gustavo
Larrea and later through Interior Minister Gustavo Jalkh, set out to purge the police structure and,
above all, submitting it to civilian control, eliminating its autonomy, and therefore invalidating its
personería jurídica.
To accomplish this, the government had to begin with the top police leadership, and it has fired
29 generals, forcing them into retirement, and begun investigations in 170 cases of professional
misconduct and 517 cases of insubordination.
In addition, the government has disbanded the GAO and the UIES, putting the majority of the
leadership of both groups under the disposition of the judiciary.
The Sept. 30 uprising, which resulted in the deaths of 10 people, also led to the investigation of 720
police to indentify the leaders of that action.
Within police ranks, anonymous messages have circulated exposing the leaders' anomalies, which
have justified the government's action, but messages have also circulated accusing the government
of carrying out revenge on behalf of urban guerrillas who were active in Ecuador in the 1980s.
"Since this administration took office, those from Alfaro Vive who went to investigate in the police
archives, where we had their records, and on finding them there, proposed destroying the police
from the government, to destroy their histories," commented a police officer to explain what he
considered "harassment" of the national police by militants of an incipient Ecuadoran urban
guerrilla group that was active during the administration of former President León Febres Cordereo
(1984-1988).
Despite government efforts, some corrupt police groups are still operating and have taken over
some police sectors and localities such as in the coastal province of Los Ríos, where the government
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has still been unable to break the ties between various police authorities in the province and
organized-crime gangs.
Given this situation, and beyond the police irritations that provoked the uprising, the question is
what will happen with the fired police? Since they already have ties with organized crime, it is most
likely that after being fired they will join the ranks of criminals. This is already happening since
former police are increasingly being arrested for involvement in crimes such as murder and bank
robberies.
The national government does not have an easy job, but it has been the first government to try to
bell the cat, to try to purge an institution that all previous administrations allowed to act with too
much discretion.

-- End --
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